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Significant Development in Maritime Personal Injury
Law
Dean A. Sutherland*
Rather than survey numerous recent maritime personal injury
decisions, this article focuses on two recent cases that address the
validity of contractual indemnity agreements covering personal
injuries sustained by Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA)
workers on "special purpose" vessels.
I. "SPECIAL PURPOSE" VESSELS AS OCSLA SITUSES
During 2002, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit rendered two important decisions regarding contractual
indemnity claims related to maritime personal injuries sustained by
offshore oilfield workers: Demette v. Falcon Drilling Co., Inc.' and
Diamond Offshore Co. v. A&B Builders, Inc.2
In an attempt to clarify this complex area of the law, the Demette
majority panel opinion interpreted the 1978 amendments to the
OCSLA and established a new test to determine when a "special
purpose" vessel, used by the oil and gas industry to develop and
Copyright 2004, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
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1. 280 F.3d 492, (5th Cir. 2002), rehearing and rehearing en banc denied,
2002 WL 1022097 (5th Cir. 2002). The panel vacated its earlier decision, Demette
v. Falcon Drilling Co., Inc., 253 F.3d 840 (5th Cir. 2001). The only difference in
the new panel majority opinion was the deletion of footnote 52, which had
provided:
We do not imply that if Louisiana law did apply to this contract, it could
invalidate the indemnity agreement. State law is incorporated as surrogate
federal law by OCSLA only to the extent that it does not conflict with
federal law. State law therefore could not invalidate indemnity agreements
declared valid by the LHWCA. See 33 U.S.C.A. § 905(c); H.R. Conf.
Rep. No. 98-1027, at 23 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2771,
2773 (stating that Section 905(c) "would preempt the application of state
laws prohibiting such indemnity agreements").
Judge DeMoss also issued a new dissenting opinion, in which he added notes 1-4
and note 8, along with minor language changes material to support his argument
that jacked-up rigs lose their vessel status. Demette, 280 F.3d at 516-17.
2. 302 F.3d 531(5th Cir. 2002). The district court decision, rendered before
Demette, relied upon the earlier en banc Fifth Circuit decision in Mills v.
Department of Labor, 877 F.2d 356 (5th Cir. 1989). The Fifth Circuit remanded
Diamond Offshore to the district court because the record contained no evidence
indicating whether the semi-submersible rig was floating or attached to the OCS at
the time of the underlying personal injury. Diamond Offshore, 302 F.3d at 551.
If Diamond Offshore returns to the Fifth Circuit, the opportunity to correct the
flawed application of the Demette test may be presented to the en banc court.
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produce mineral resources from beneath the Outer Continental Shelf
of the United States (OCS), constitutes an OCSLA situs. It concluded
that when a jack-up rig is jacked-up over the floor of the OCS, it has
a dual status-it remains a vessel pursuant to the general maritime
law, but it also constitutes an OCSLA situs.3
The effect of this conclusion is that while a special purpose vessel
is "temporarily attached" to the seabed, reciprocal indemnity
agreements between the vessel owner and a Longshore and Harbor
Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA) maritime employer are
enforceable, pursuant to 33 U.S.C. § 905 (b).4
The dissenting judge inDemette issued a spirited opinion, arguing
that a jack-up rig or any other "special purpose" oilfield vessel loses
its status as a vessel while it is "attached" to the seabed of the OCS
(during which time it would be legally identical to OCS fixed
platforms). Presumably, the special purpose vessel would regain its
vessel status when it is jacked-down and again floating on navigable
waters. The dissenting judge's call for an en banc rehearing of
Demette to adopt this position was not accepted.
The Demette majority panel decision has been subjected to
scholarly criticism.' Despite the questionable statutory support for
3. According to the Conference Committee report, the 1978 amendments were
"technical and perfecting and meant to restate and clarify and not change existing
law." H.R. Conf. Rep. 95-1474, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1674, Section 203-Laws
Applicable to the Outer Continental Shelf.
4. 33 U.S.C. § 905(b):
In the event of injury to a person covered under this chapter caused by the
negligence of a vessel, then such person, or anyone otherwise entitled to
recover damages by reason thereof, may bring an action against such
vessel as a third party in accordance with the provisions of section 933 of
this title, and the employer shall not be liable to the vessel for such
damages directly or indirectly and any agreements or warranties to the
contrary shall be void ....
33 U.S.C. § 905(c) (1972):
In the event that the negligence of a vessel causes injury to a person
entitled to receive benefits under this Act by virtue of section 1333 of Title
43, then such person, or anyone otherwise entitled to recover damages by
reason thereof, may bring an action against such vessel in accordance with
the provisions of subsection (b) of this section. Nothing contained in
subsection (b) of this section shall preclude the enforcement according to
its terms of any reciprocal indemnity provision whereby the employer of
a person entitled to receive benefits under this chapter by virtue of section
1333 of Title 43 and the vessel agree to defend and indemnify the other for
cost of defense and loss or liability for damages arising out of or resulting
from death or bodily injury to their employees.
5. See David W. Robertson & Michael F. Sturley, Recent Developments in
Admiralty and Maritime Law at the National Level and in the Fifth and Eleventh
Circuits, Winter 2001, 26 Tul. Mar. L. J. 193,244-47 (2001) [hereinafter Robertson
& Sturley, Winter]; see also David & Michael F. Sturley, Recent Developments in
(Vol. 64300
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the Demette reasoning, another Fifth Circuit panel in Diamond
Offshore felt obliged to follow the Demette OCSLA situs test,
following the rule that one panel cannot overrule or ignore an earlier
panel's decision.6
In Diamond Offshore, the injured worker was aboard a semi-
submersible drilling rig in navigable waters over the Outer
Continental Shelf of the United States. The Fifth Circuit applied the
new Demette OCSLA situs test but remanded the case to the district
court for a hearing to obtain evidence about whether the semi-
submersible drilling rig was anchored or was in transit at the time of
the underlying personal injury. Presumably, if the semi-submersible
drilling rig was anchored or otherwise simply in contact with the
seabed, the Fifth Circuit will hold this vessel to be an OCSLA situs,
if it applies the Demette OCSLA situs test without serious analysis.
The premise of this article is that the Demette OCSLA situs test
for special purpose vessels is fundamentally flawed. Both the
published criticisms of the Demette test, as well as this author's
separate statutory objection, are discussed in greater detail later in this
article. They suggest that the en banc Fifth Circuit may wish to
review the Demette OCSLA situs test, if the Diamond Offshore case
returns to it.
II. BACKGROUND OF THE OSCLA
To understand the context in which this issue arose, some
background information is necessary. Near the end of World War II,
oil production moved offshore into shallow water adjacent to several
states. With rapidly improving technology, the oil industry developed
the ability to locate and obtain oil and gas from beneath the seabed in
deeper water, beyond the adjacent states' territorial boundaries.
Initially, access to these subsurface oil and gas reserves was from
fixed platforms erected on the seabed.
At that time, the United States had not established sovereignty
over the seabed and the buried resources beyond state territorial
waters. A Presidential Proclamation and U.S. Supreme Court rulings
initially established federal sovereignty over the Outer Continental
Shelf and the subsurface mineral resources.7
Admiralty and Maritime Law at the National Level and in the Fifth and Eleventh
Circuits, Summer 2003, 27 Tul. Mar. L .J. 495, 574 (2003) [hereinafter Robertson
& Sturley, Summer].
6. Diamond Offshore, 302 F.3d at 551 (citing United States v. Ruiz, 180 F.3d
at 676 (5th Cir. 1999).
7. H.R. Rep. No. 95-570, 56-57 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1450, 1463-64.
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In 1953, Congress enacted the OCSLA to establish the law
governing conduct on the Outer Continental Shelf, which by then was
an area of intense activity that lacked an established legal system
because it was beyond state territorial boundaries. Congress enacted
the OCSLA "to define a body of law applicable to the seabed, the
subsoil, and the fixed structures... on the Outer Continental Shelf."
Congress made non-maritime federal law applicable to the subsoil,
seabed, and platforms.9 In the event no federal law existed on a
particular issue, Congress elected to borrow the adjacent state's law
as surrogate federal law.'" It considered, and specifically rejected, the
idea that federal maritime law would be adequate for those needs.
Thus, the OCSLA is a gap-filling statute, initially designed to
apply federal law to fixed structures that were erected on the OCS for
the purpose of developing and producing oil and gas and that were
not covered by either maritime law or state law."
Between 1953 and 1978, the oil and gas industry created a variety
of "special purpose" vessels, including jack-up rigs 2 and semi-
submersible rigs, 3 from which the exploration, development and
production of oil and gas from the OCS could be performed. The
courts have consistently treated these floating special purpose drilling
rigs as vessels in navigation, governed by the general maritime law,
even though only a small portion of their time is spent moving from
location to location.'
4
8. Rodrigue v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 395 U.S. 352, 355, 89 S. Ct. 1835,
1837 (1969); 43 U.S.C. § 1333(a) (1984).
9. Id. at 355- 56, 89 S. Ct. at 1837.
10. Id., 89 S. Ct. at 1837; 43 U.S.C. § 1333(a)(2)(A) (1984).
11. Mills v. Dir., Office of Workers' Comp., 877 F.2d 356, 358 (5th Cir. 1989)
(en banc).
12. A jack-up rig has long legs that are lowered to the seabed. The drilling
floor (and hull) are "jacked-up" on those legs high above the storm height of
cresting waves. Ron Baker, A Primer of Oilwell Drilling 166 (Petroleum Extension
Service, University of Texas 5th ed. 1996).
13. A semi-submersible drilling rig is a movable floating rig. Typically, it is
towed to a location, where it is submerged about fifty feet and then anchored in
place to complete the mooring of the rig. The rig's platform deck is supported on
columns which are attached to large underwater displacement hulls, large vertical
caissons, or some combination of both. The columns, displacement hulls, or
caissons are flooded on location. Thomas J. Schoenbaum, 1 Admiralty and
Maritime Law § 3-9, at 108 n.8 (3d ed. 2001) (describing semi-submersible rigs
and other rigs); Howard R. Williams & Charles J. Meyers, Manual of Oil and Gas
Terms 996 (11 th ed. 2000) (defining semi-submersible rig).
14. See Offshore v. Robison, 266 F.2d 769 (5th Cir.1959) (approved in
principle by the Supreme Court in McDermott Int'l v. Wilander, 498 U.S. 337, 111
S. Ct. 807 (1991)). See also Colomb v. Texaco, 736 F.2d 218, 221 (5th Cir. 1984),
collecting cases holding that crew members aboard drilling and other special
purpose vessels are seamen as a matter of law.
302 [Vol. 64
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For a variety of reasons, the OCSLA was amended in 1978."5
These amendments form the basis of the controversy concerning the
status of "special purpose" vessels as OCSLA situses. The applicable
portion of the OCSLA, as amended, provides:
43 U.S.C. § 1333. Laws and regulations governing lands
(a) Constitution and United States laws; laws of adjacent
States; publication of projected State lines;
international boundary disputes; restriction on State
taxation and jurisdiction.
(1) The Constitution and laws and civil and political
jurisdiction of the United States are extended to the
subsoil and seabed of the outer Continental Shelf and
to all artificial islands, and all installations and other
devices permanently or temporarily attached to the
seabed, which may be erected thereon for the purpose
of exploring for, developing, or producing resources
therefrom, or any such installation or other device
(other than a ship or vessel) for the purpose of
transporting such resources, to the same extent as if the
outer Continental Shelf were an area of exclusive
Federal jurisdiction located within a State: Provided,
however, That mineral leases on the outer Continental
Shelf shall be maintained or issued only under the
provisions of this subchapter.
(2) (A) To the extent that they are applicable and not
inconsistent with this subchapter or with other Federal
laws and regulations of the Secretary now in effect or
hereafter adopted, the civil and criminal laws of each
adjacent State, now in effect or hereafter adopted,
amended, or repealed are declared to be the law of the
United States for that portion of the subsoil and seabed
of the outer Continental Shelf, and artificial islands and
fixed structures erected thereon, which would be within
the area of the State if its boundaries were extended
seaward to the outer margin of the outer Continental
Shelf, and the President shall determine and publish in
the Federal Register such projected lines extending
seaward and defining each such area. All of such
applicable laws shall be administered and enforced by
15. See H.R. Conf. Rep. 95-1474 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1674.
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the appropriate officers and courts of the United States.
State taxation laws shall not apply to the outer
Continental Shelf.
(b) Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act
applicable; definitions
With respect to disability or death of an employee
resulting from any injury occurring as the result of
operations conducted on the outer Continental Shelf for
the purpose of exploring for, developing, removing, or
transporting by pipeline the natural resources, or
involving rights to the natural resources, of the subsoil
and seabed of the outer Continental Shelf,
compensation shall be payable under the provisions of
the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act
[33 U.S.C.A. § 901 et seq.]. For the purposes of the
extension of the provisions of the Longshore and
Harbor Workers' Compensation Act under this section-
(1) the term "employee" does not include a master or
member of a crew of any vessel, or an officer or
employee of the United States or any agency thereof or
of any State or foreign government, or of any political
subdivision thereof;
(2) the term "employer" means an employer any of
whose employees are employed in such operations; and
(3) the term "United States" when used in a
geographical sense ineludes the outer Continental Shelf
and artificial islands and fixed structures thereon.
The 1978 amendments to the OCSLA changed § 203(a), by
substituting "and all installations and other devices permanently or
temporarily attached to the seabed, which may be erected thereon for
the purpose of exploring for, developing, or producing resources
therefrom, or any such installation or other device (other than a ship or
vessel) for the purpose of transporting such resources," for "and fixed
structures which may be erected thereon for the purpose of exploring
for, developing, removing and transporting resources therefrom." §
203(b) was not amended. Z
In general, the OCSLA: (1) applies federal law to certain
structures and devices located on the Outer Continental Shelf; (2)
applies the LHWCA as the worker's compensation law applicable to
covered OCSLA workers; (3) when not in conflict with federal law,
16. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1333, 203(a), 203(b).
304 [Vol. 64
DEAN A. SUTHERLAND
incorporates the laws of the state adjacent to the OCSLA situs as
surrogate federal law; and (4) exempts Jones Act seamen from its
coverage.' 7
I. UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
The United States Supreme Court has rendered two key opinions
addressing the substantive law applicable to OCSLA workers killed
or injured on, or while in transit to or from, fixed platforms on the
OCS.' s In Rodrigue, the Court held that for federal law to oust the
adopted adjacent state law as surrogate federal law, the federal law
must first apply.'9 Congress expressly decided that OCSLA fixed
platforms constitute "artificial islands," as to which admiralty
jurisdiction and substantive maritime law do not apply.2" Thus, the
OCSLA ousts maritime law. In Rodrigue, Louisiana law, as the
adjacent state's law, was applied as surrogate federal law pursuant to
43 U.S.C. §1333(a)(2).
In Offshore Logistics v. Tallentire,2" the Court held that OCSLA
coverage is primarily based on the location of the injury-producing
event and that the OCSLA does not provide a non-maritime remedy
for fatal accidents that occur on the high seas while OCSLA workers
were being transported to shore.22
17. 43 U.S.C. § 1333 (1984).
18. Rodrigue, 395 U.S. 352, 89 S. Ct. 1835; Offshore Logistics, Inc. v.
Tallentire, 477 U.S. 207, 106 S. Ct. 2485 (1986).
19. Id. at 359-66, 89 S. Ct. at 1839-42.
20. Accidents on the artificial islands covered by OCSLA "had no more
connection with the ordinary stuff of admiralty than do accidents on piers."
Rodrigue, 395 U.S. at 360, 89 S. Ct. 1839. See also Herb's Welding, Inc. v. Gray,
470 U.S. 414, 422, 105 S. Ct. 1421, 1426, (1985).
21. 477 U.S. 207, 217-18, 106 S. Ct. 2870, 2491-92 (1986).
22. In Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473, 101 S. Ct. 2870
(1981), the Court considered and rejected the claim that federal courts had
exclusive jurisdiction over a personal injury claim arising from an incident, not on
the fixed platform, but on boats in the waters immediately adjacent to the platforms.
In Tallentire, the Court explained that the "character of the decedents as platform
workers who have a special relationship with the shore community simply has no
special relevance to the resolution of the question of the application of OCSLA to
this case." Neither Rodrigue nor Gulf Offshore endorsed:
the proposition that it is the decedent's status or his special relationship
with the shore that required the application of OCSLA, regardless of the
location of the accident. Indeed, no question was even raised in Gulf
Offshore regarding whether OCSLA applied to an accident aboard a vessel
adjacent to the platform. Moreover, the facts of these cases make clear that
OCSLA was presumed applicable not because of the status of the
decedents but because of the proximity of the workers' accidents to the
platforms and the fact that the fatalities were intimately connected with the
decedents' work on the platforms.
2004] 305
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The new Demette OCSLA situs test arose out of a claim for
contractual indemnity for a personal injury sustained by a non-seaman
OCSLA worker aboard a "jacked-up" Falcon drilling rig. Further
background information is necessary before the contractual indemnity
issues present in Demette are examined.
IV. RESTRICTIONS ON THE VALIDITY OF CONTRACTUAL INDEMNITY
PROVISIONS
To determine the validity of contractual indemnity claims arising
out of personal injuries sustained by offshore workers, courts must
determine what substantive law applies to the contract. Of the
potentially applicable laws that may affect the validity of indemnity
provisions in oilfield contracts for work performed on the OCS,
conflicts exist between (1) the general maritime law, (2) the Longshore
and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA), and (3) the laws
of some states adjacent to the offshore situs of the personal injury. The
general maritime law applies to vessels operating in navigable waters.
It has no blanket prohibition against indemnity agreements. 23
The LHWCA has two provisions applicable to contractual
indemnity claims, 33 U.S.C. § 905(b) and 33 U.S.C. § 905(C). 24 The
1972 amendments to the LHWCA added § 905(b), which, among other
things, invalidates any direct or indirect indemnity agreement from a
covered maritime employer to a vessel owner or operator. The 1984
amendments to the LHWCA added § 905(c), which provides that
notwithstanding § 905(b), when the injured worker is entitled to receive
LHWCA benefits "by virtue of the OCSLA," a reciprocal indemnity
agreement between the maritime employer and a vessel owner or
operator is valid.
Most of the OCS exploration, development, and production of oil
and gas in the United States occurs off the coasts of Texas and
Louisiana. Both of these states are in the jurisdiction of the Fifth
We do not interpret § 4 of OCSLA, 43 U.S.C. § 1333, to require or permit
us to extend the coverage of the statute to the platform workers in this case
who were killed miles away from the platform and on the high seas simply
because they were platform workers. Congress determined that the general
scope of OCSLA's coverage, like the operation of DOHSA's remedies,
would be determined principally by locale, not by the status of the
individual injured or killed.
Tallentire, 477 U.S. at 218-20, 106 S. Ct. at 2492-93.
23. Indemnity agreements are valid under maritime law. See Lefler v. Atlantic
Richfield Co., 785 F.2d 1341, 1343 (5th Cir.1986); Angelina Cas. Co. v. Exxon
Corp., 876 F.2d 40 (5th Cir. 1989).




Circuit.25 Each state has enacted legislation that invalidates certain
contractual provisions that otherwise would allow an oil company to
be indemnified by its contractors.26
The task of determining which body of substantive law applies to
determine the validity of a contractual indemnity provision in a
contract for oilfield work performed on the OCS can be daunting.
While the substantive law regulating the tort liability for the
underlying personal injury claim is primarily determined by the
location of the injury-producing incident,27 the applicable law
regarding the validity of contractual indemnity provisions turns in
part on whether the contract is a maritime contract, a mixed contract
or a non-maritime contract. That determination is based on the
subject matter of the contract, not necessarily by the place of its
performance.28
A contract falls within the admiralty jurisdiction (and thus is
regulated by the substantive maritime law) if the nature and character
of the contract are maritime, meaning that the contract relates to a
maritime service or a maritime transaction.29 However, many oilfield
contracts contain both maritime and non-maritime elements. These
"mixed contracts" require additional analysis.
As a general rule, a contract "will not be within the admiralty
jurisdiction unless it is wholly maritime."3 There are two judicially-
recognized exceptions to this rule. First, if the non-maritime
elements of the contract are incidental to, and not separable from, the
maritime elements, admiralty jurisdiction will apply to the entire
claim.3' Second, if the non-maritime elements are separable from the
maritime elements, so that they may be litigated separately without
25. See Thomas M. Kratochvil, The Hypothetical Treatment of a Wrongful
Death Claim in the Demise of an Oil Service Company Worker Aboard a Drilling
Vessel on the United States Outer Continental Shelf, 48 Loy. L. Rev. 755, 778 n.96.
26. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rerm. Code Ann. §§ 127.001-127.007 (Vernon
1997); La. R.S. § 9:2780(B).
27. Whether a personal injury claim falls within the admiralty jurisdiction
depends in part on the location of the injury-producing incident on navigable waters
or whether injury suffered on land was caused by a vessel on navigable waters and
the incident's connection with maritime activity. The connection test has two
components. Using an intermediate level of possible generality, the court must
determine: whether the general features of the type of incident has a potentially
disruptive impact on maritime commerce and whether the general character of the
activity giving rise to the incident shows a substantial relationship to traditional
maritime activity. Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 513
U.S. 527, 538, 540, 115 S. Ct. 1043, 1050-51 (1995).
28. See Schoenbaum, supra note 13, at § 3-10.
29. See 1 Steven F. Friedell, Benedict on Admiralty § 182, n.33, § 181, at
12-2. (7th ed. 2002).
30. Id. § 183 at 12-10, n.33.
31. Id.
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prejudice to either party, admiralty jurisdiction will apply to the
separable maritime element.32  However, if the non-maritime
elements of the contract are both significant and inseparable, federal
courts will not exercise admiralty jurisdiction.33
To summarize, a maritime contractual indemnity provision is
valid and enforceable if it is not barred by some other statutory
provision. The only two potentially applicable statutory provisions
that could invalidate a contractual indemnity obligation in the context
of offshore oilfield workers are § 905(b) of the LHWCA [which
invalidates any indemnity agreement from a covered maritime
employer in favor of a vessel owner or operator] or the law of an
adjacent state, as surrogate federal law under the OCSLA. However,
§ 905(c) of the LHWCA provides that when a worker is entitled to
LHWCA benefits by virtue of the OCSLA (33 U.S.C. § 1333(b)), §
905(b) of the LHWCA does not invalidate a reciprocal indemnity
agreement between a maritime employer and a vessel owner or
operator.
V. DEMETTE V. R.B. FALCON USA, INC.
Demette v. R.B. Falcon USA, Inc. involved the validity of a
reciprocal indemnity agreement between a maritime employer and a
vessel owner.34 The underlying personal injury occurred aboard a
jack-up drilling rig owned by Falcon, while the rig was jacked-up on
the OCS off the coast of Louisiana.35
A reciprocal indemnity agreement existed between Falcon (the rig
operator) and the maritime employer, Frank's Casing & Crew Rental
Tools (Frank's), by which each agreed to be responsible for damages
resulting from negligent injuries to their own employees.36
The injured plaintiff (Kermit Demette), a Frank's employee, sued
the rig operator, Falcon, pursuant to § 905(b) of the LHWCA.37 The
rig operator filed a third-party demand against the maritime employer
(Frank's) to enforce the contractual indemnity agreement. After the
district court granted summary judgment to the rig operator,
upholding the indemnity and defense agreement, Frank's agreed to
fund a settlement with Demette and to pay the rig operator's costs of
defense. However, Frank's reserved its appeal rights.38 Frank's
challenged the validity of its contractual indemnity obligations, based
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Demette v. Falcon Drilling Co., 280 F.3d 492, 495 (5th Cir. 2002).
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 494.
38. Id. at 495.
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on the Louisiana oilfield anti-indemnity statute, La. Rev. Stat.
9:2780(B), and on the anti-indemnity provision of § 905(b) of the
LHWCA.39
Purporting to apply the 1978 amendments to the Outer
Continental Shelf Lands Act, the Fifth Circuit established a new
procedure for determining when the OCSLA applies to contractual
indemnity claims arising out of personal injuries sustained by workers
aboard "special purpose vessels."40 The Demette panel majority
concluded that the jacked-up drilling rig maintained its status as a
vessel." As such, general maritime law applied of its own force,
precluding the applicability of La. Rev. Stat. 9:2780(B), pursuant to
43 U.S.C. § 1333(a)(2)(A), which precludes the adoption of state law
that is "inconsistent ... with Federal laws." '42 The panel majority
opinion held that maritime law was the "Federal law" that prevented
the application of the Louisiana Oil Anti-Indemnity Statute.43
In an unusual twist, based on the fact that the jacked-up drilling
rig was "temporarily attached to the seabed of the OCS," the panel
majority determined that the 1978 amendments to the OCSLA
compelled the conclusion that the jacked-up rig was simultaneously
a "vessel" governed by maritime law and an OCSLA situs.44 This
"dual capacity" legal status for a single "artificial island, and
installation or and other device" is unique to this case and cannot
easily be reconciled with the language of the OCSLA or the
jurisprudence interpreting that statute (either before or after the 1978
amendments).
The panel majority rejected the maritime employer's claim that
the contractual indemnity provision was invalid pursuant to § 905(b)
of the LHWCA, holding that as the jacked-up rig was an OCSLA
situs, § 905(c) of the LHWCA was the applicable provision.45 It
also rejected the maritime employer's contentions that § 905(c)
could only apply when the sole basis for LHWCA coverage was 33
39. Id. at 494.
40. See supra note 4.
41. Demette, 280 F.3d at 498.
42. Id. at 502.
43. Recall that in Rodrigue, the U. S. Supreme Court held that maritime law has
no application to OCSLA fixed platforms, therefore maritime law could not oust the
contrary provisions of an adjacent state's law that was adopted as surrogate federal
law, pursuant to 43 U.S.C. § 1333(a)(2)(A). Contrary to the panel majority
opinion's assertion that the 1978 amendment to § 1333(a)(1) "creates a 'situs'
requirement for the application of other sections of the OCSLA," Id. at 496, neither
the language of the 1978 amendments, the cases cited in notes 9 and 10 (Tallentire
and Mills v. Director, OWCP, 877 F.2d 356, 361-62 (5th Cir. 1989) (en banc), nor
the legislative history support that statement.
44. Id. at 500-02.
45. Id. at 502-03.
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U.S.C. § 1333(b) and that as Demette was also covered by the
LHWCA by its own force, § 905(b) of the LHWCA voided its• • • 46
contractual indemnity obligation.
A. Analysis of the Demette Opinion
It is respectfully submitted that both the panel majority opinion
and the dissent in Demette improperly interpreted the 1978
amendments to the OCSLA. The panel majority could have upheld
the reciprocal indemnity agreement pursuant to § 905(c) of the
LHWCA, without the necessity of creating the flawed conclusion
that the jacked-up vessel simultaneously can be a vessel governed
by the general maritime law and an OCSLA situs governed by the
OCSLA.
Section 905(c) of the LHWCA validates reciprocal indemnity
agreements between vessel owners and maritime employers, when
the injured employee is entitled to recover LHWCA benefits
pursuant to §1333(b) of the OCSLA. As noted by Professors
Robertson and Sturley,4 7 the 1978 amendments to the OCSLA did
not amend § 1333(b) of the OCSLA to impose a situs requirement:
The notion that §1333(b)-allowing OCSLA workers
who are not seamen to receive benefits according to the
LHWCA-has the same 'situs' criteria as §1333(a)(1) is
challenged by the language of §1333(b)-as to 'situs.' It is
far broader than that of §1333(a)(1). 43 U.S.C. §1333(b)
provides in pertinent part:
With respect to disability or death of an employee
resulting from any injury occurring as the result of
operations conducted on the outer Continental Shelf for the
purpose of exploring for, developing, removing, or
transporting by pipeline the natural resources, or involving
rights to the natural resources, of the subsoil and seabed of
the outer Continental Shelf, compensation shall be payable
under the provisions of the [LHWCA].
The notion that §1333(b) is limited by the 'situs' description in
§1333(a)(1 is also challenged by Offshore Logistics, Inc. v.
Tallentire4 and by Green v. Industrial Helicopters, Inc.4 9
46. Id. This point has been followed in Sumrall v. Ensco Offshore Co., 291
F.3d 316 (5th Cir. 2002) and in Diamond Offshore, 302 F.3d 531.
47. See Robertson & Sturley, Winter, supra note 5, at 245-49.
48. 477 U.S. 207, 219 n.2, 106 S. Ct. 2485, 2493 n.2 (indicating, obliquely,
that the decedents in that case, who fell outside the coverage of § 1333(a)(1) and
§ 1333(a)(2) because they died miles from any platform or other outer continental
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The dissenting judge in Demette argued that, pursuant to the 1978
amendments to the OCSLA, jacked-up rigs temporarily attached to
the seabed lose their status as "vessels" and must be treated in the
same fashion as the fixed platforms discussed in Rodrigue v. Aetna.5
Under that theory, the contractual indemnity provision would have
been invalidated by Louisiana Revised Statutes § 9:2780(B). The
dissenting opinion was justifiably criticized for its failure to recognize
that the statutory basis for the Rodrigue decision was 33 U.S.C. §
1333(a)(2) (which was not amended in 1978), rather than 33 U.S.C.
§ 1333(a)(1).5 '
The strongest support for the dissent's position lies in the quoted
portions of the House Committee Report.52 However, that quoted
language from that 1977 House Committee Report conflicted with the
language of a later House Conference Report.53 The panel majority
opinion correctly rejected the dissent's attempt to use legislative
history to counter the statute's plain language.'
B. Statutory Flaw in the Demette OCSLA Situs Test for "Special
Purpose" Vessels
In addition to the scholarly disagreements with the Demette
OCSLA situs test discussed above, the author of this article submits
that an additional flaw exists in the Fifth Circuit's application of its
shelf (OCS) fixture were nevertheless covered by § 1333(b)).
49. 593 So. 2d 634, n.5 (La. 1992) (indicating that OCS workers who died in
a helicopter crash on the shelf, but distant from any platform or other OCS fixture,
were covered by § 1333(b)).
50. 395 U.S. 352, 89 S. Ct. 1835.
51. Robertson & Sturley, Winter, supra note 5, at 245-46.
52. House Committee Report No. 95-590 on this legislation states the
following in the section-by-section analysis:
Section 203.-Laws Applicable to Outer Continental Shelf
Section (a) amends section 4(a)(1) of the OCS Act of 1953 by changing
the term "fixed structures" to "and all installations and other devices
permanently or temporarily attached to the seabed" and making other
technical changes. It is thus made clear that Federal law is to be applicable
to all activities on all devices in contact with the seabed for exploration,
development, and production. The committee intends that Federal law is,
therefore, to be applicable to activities on drillingships, semi-submersible
drilling rigs, and other watercraft, when they are connected to the seabed
by drillstring, pipes, or other appurtenances, on the OCS for exploration,
development, or production purposes. Ships and vessels are specifically
not covered when they are being used for the purpose of transporting OCS
mineral resources.
H.R. Rep. No. 95-590 (1978) (emphasis added).
53. H.R. Rep. No. 95-1474, at 80-82, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.1674, at 1679-81.
54. Demette, 28 F.3d 492, 503-04 (5th Cir. 2002). See Barnhart v. Sigmon
Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 450, 122 S. Ct. 941, 950 (2002).
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new Demette OCSLA situs test. In establishing a test for determining
which installations and devices constitute OCSLA situses, the
Demette panel majority opinion improperly limited its focus on
whether the special purpose vessel was "permanently or temporarily
'attached' to the seabed at the time of the underlying injury that
produced the contractual indemnity claim.55
Demette restated this statutory provision into the following test:
The OCSLA applies to all of the following locations:
(1) the subsoil and seabed of the OCS;
(2) any artificial island, installation, or other device if
(a) it is permanently or temporarily attached to the
seabed of the OCS, and
(b) it has been erected on the seabed of the OCS, and
(c) its presence on the OCS is to explore for, develop,
or produce resources from the OCS;
(3) any artificial island, installation, or other device if
(a) it is permanently or temporarily attached to the
seabed of the OCS, and
(b) it is not a ship or vessel, and
(c) its presence on the OCS is to transport resources
from the OCS.56
As applied by the Demette court, this OCSLA situs test fails to
accord a different meaning to the statutory requirement that, in
addition to an artificial island, installation or other device being
permanently or temporarily attached to the seabed, the artificial
island, installation or device must have been "erected [on the seabed]
for the purpose of exploring for, developing, or producing
resources. ' 57
The clear language of 33 U.S.C. § 1333(a)(1) demonstrates that
the "erected"clause is a separate OCSLA situs requirement. That
55. 43 U.S.C. § 1333(a)(1) provides:
The Constitution and laws and civil and political jurisdiction of the
United States are extended to the subsoil and seabed of the Outer
Continental Shelf and to all artificial islands, and all installations and
other devices permanently or temporarily attached to the seabed, which
may be erected thereon for the purpose of exploring for, developing, or
producing resources therefrom, or any such installation or other device
(other than a ship or vessel) for the purpose of transporting such
resources, to the same extent as if the outer Continental Shelf were an
area of exclusive Federal jurisdiction located within a State: Provided,
however, That mineral leases on the outer Continental Shelf shall be
maintained or issued only under the provisions of this subchapter.
(emphasis added).




"erected" requirement was not affected by the 1978 amendments to
that section of the OCSLA.
VI. DIAMOND OFFSHORE v. A&B BUILDERS
As noted above, Diamond Offshore v. A & B Builders, another
contractual indemnity claim arising out of the use of a different type
of "special purpose" vessel, reached the Fifth Circuit in 2002.58
This case constitutes the most recent discussion by the Fifth Circuit
concerning contractual indemnity provisions in OCSLA oilfield
contracts.
The injured worker, an employee of A&B Builders, Inc. claimed
that he sustained personal injuries while he was performing repair
services on a semi-submersible drilling rig" owned by Diamond.
Like Demette, both companies had entered into contracts containing
reciprocal indemnity provisions. The issue as presented to the court
is whether the semi-submersible drilling rig constitutes an OCSLA
situs.
The district court decision, rendered before Demette, relied upon
the earlier en banc Fifth Circuit decision in Mills v. Department of
Labor.6 ° The Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded the Diamond
Offshore case to the district court because the record contained no
evidence indicating whether the semi-submersible rig was floating
or attached to the OCS at the time of the underlying personal
injury.6
As noted in this article, the proper inquiry should be whether the
injured worker is entitled to receive LHWCA benefits from his
employer pursuant to § 1333(b) of the OCSLA. If so, § 905(c) of
the LHWCA will permit enforcement of the reciprocal indemnity
agreement as a matter of law. It should be unnecessary to have to
introduce evidence concerning whether the semi-submersible
drilling rig was a Demette OCSLA situs in order to obtain the
benefit of § 905(c) of the LHWCA.
However, if all panels in the Fifth Circuit must attempt to apply
the Demette test in cases involving reciprocal indemnity agreements
in contracts for oilfield work over the OCS, it is difficult to
anticipate how a floating semi-submersible drilling rig can be
"erected" on the seabed of the OCS.
58. 302F.3d531.
59. Described in note 13, supra.
60. 877 F.2d 356 (5th Cir. 1989).
61. Diamond Offshore, 302 F.3d at 551.
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VII. CONCLUSION
Applying the OCSLA to a jacked-up drilling rig whose legs are
temporarily attached to the seabed of the OCS and/or to anchored,
floating semi-submersible drilling rigs is inconsistent with the second
prong of the current OCSLA situs provision, i.e.,: (1) that the
installation or device be permanently or temporarily "attached" to the
seabed; and (2) that the installation or device be "erected" on the
seabed for the purpose of exploring for, developing or producing
reserves. Moreover, such a factual determination should not be
necessary in order to trigger the § 905(c) provision of the LHWCA,
which allows reciprocal indemnity agreements to be enforced. The
Fifth Circuit should jettison the Demette test at its earliest
convenience.
